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EU-Pakistan Relations and GSP Plus:  
Towards an End of Europe’s ‘Whitewashing’? 
Dr. Siegfried O. Wolf 
If one believes official statements, it seems that the EU accomplished an evolution in its 
relations with Pakistan. There is no doubt that the cooperation between Europe and 
Pakistan in terms of economic and development assistance has expanded over the last 
decades.Realizing the re-emergence of the EU as a majoreconomic actor as well as its 
own tremendous need for development and industrialization (cf. Lieven, 2002), Pakistan 
started looking towards Europe as partner. A first agreement that was made to set up 
relations between Islamabad and Brussels was signed in 1962, which was followed by 
the first comprehensive agreement in 1976 to further intensify trade and economic ties. 
Currently, the legal and political basis for the relations between Brussels and 
Islamabad is the 2004 Cooperation Agreement. Additionally, within the framework of 
the Lisbon treaty of 2009, the EU-Pakistan 5-year Engagement Plan was 
launchedwhich was supposed to further widen and deepen the cooperation between 
Europe and the South Asian state. At least on paper, the endorsed agreement was 
adding to trade, economic cooperation and development,and also addressed the issues 
of regional security, counter terrorism, narco-trafficking, and organized crime. Another 
significant initial determinant of the 5-year plan was to strengthen the process of 
strengthening democratic institutions, civilian-administrative structures, and civil 
society.The signing of a memorandum of understanding on civilian capacity building for 
law enforcement in Pakistan in November 2010 has to be seen in this context.One of 
the outcomes of this document was the creation of the National Counter-
TerrorismAuthority (NACTA) and the support for provincial police forces in Khyber 
 
 
Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Punjab (cf. Sultana, 2013, 41).Furthermore, a Strategic 
Dialogue was envisaged to offer political guidance within the EU-Pakistan relations.  
In addition to the various signed documents, the EU started also to build-up it‘s 
physical presence in Pakistan in the form of an office by the European Commission in 
1985. Already three years later, the office was upgraded to a fullyfledgedEU Delegation 
in order to monitor trade and development cooperation.In 1992, the Humanitarian Aid 
and Civil Protection department of the European Commission (ECHO) opened an office 
in Islamabad too. Besides the Delegation there is also the EU-Pakistan Joint 
Commission which is complemented by a Foreign and Security Policy Dialogue at senior 
official level to give more depth to the existing collaboration. On top of that several 
regular meetingsat the expert level are held to discuss urgent matters regarding 
international affairs, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, and migration issues. 
However, the shaping of the European strategy with respect to Pakistan is not devoid of 
limitations and weaknesses. Apart fromthe intention to get more involved on the 
political and strategic dimensions,the decision makers did not go far beyond the 
economic paradigm which hastraditionallydefined the Pakistan-EU ties.Neither the Cold 
War nor the developments in the realm of security after―9/11‖ changed much in this 
respect. As aresult, there is a clear ‗economization‘of the bilateralism between 
Islamabad and Brussels which was apparently atthe expense of Europeans‘ enthusiasm 
to take a closer, consequent look at Pakistan‘sdomestic affairs, especially when it comes 
to human rights, labour rights, environmental protection, women‘s rights and the rights 
of religious minorities (cf. USDS, 2013a, 2013b). This process recently reached a new 
peak when Pakistan was granted the GSP Plus status by the EU. Under this programme 
the beneficiary state (a developing country, in casu Pakistan) is given special trade 
preferences, namely tariff reductions. The agreement is unilateral, meaning that the EU 
does not require or expect the beneficiary state to adopt similar measures reciprocally. 
Basically it provides for a flexible scheme of preferences according to the individual 
needs of the recognized states.Thereisno doubt that the GSP Plus status will give a 
 
 
boost to the country‘s economy (cf. Dawn, 2013a), especially the textile and clothing 
sector would benefit from unrestricted access to the EU‘s single market (cf. ITC 2013, 3-
4). Pakistani analysts have calculated that GSP Plus is expected to help Islamabad earn 
an additional USD 550-700 million per year with an increase in exports of USD 2 billion 
(Mirza, 2013; Daily Times, 2013). It is estimated that 20 percent of the country‘s 
exports would be allowed to enter the EU duty-free and 70 percent would benefit from 
preferential rates (Gishkori/Rana, 2013). Furthermore, Islamabad considers the 
granting of GSP Plus a matter of prestige, for it hopes that it will improve the country‘s 
tattered international standing. Pakistan‘s reputation suffered significantly from its 
image of being one of the world‘s greatest hubs for international terrorism, Islamic 
fundamentalism, and a source of all kinds of instability leading to the suppression of 
ethnic and religious minorities and tensed relations with its neighbours. Especially the 
persistently deteriorating human rights situation in the country (cf. USDS, 2013b, 1), 
enforced by religious fanaticism and certain state agencies acting with impunity, is a 
matter of severe concern that is shared by many Pakistan observers around the globe. 
In order to achieve the GSP Plus Status, it is mandatory for Pakistan to ensure human 
rights protection and to ensure compliance with key human rights conventions. More 
concretely, Pakistan has to apply and prove the following: First, it must haveratified 27 
conventions key conventions. In order to get GSP Plus, which has to be understood as a 
―special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance‖ (EC, 
2008), one has to sign and ratify 16 international conventions on human rights and 
labour rights, and 11 conventions on good governance and the environment. Second, 
Pakistan must not demonstrate serious problems with the implementation of these 
conventions (cf. Ali, 2013). Third, it may not have formulated any reservations to those 
conventions. Furthermore, Pakistan has to commit to a series of monitoring  
requirements. Here, Pakistan must provide comprehensive information concerning the 
required legislation and measures taken to implement them consequently.1 
 
 
For the time being, it seems that Pakistan‘s diplomatic and lobby machinery was able to 
convince the most important decision-making circles within the EU of the following 
things: First, they have the political will and the capacities to deal with the prerequisites 
for getting the GSP Plus Status. Second, to improve the weak coordination and 
cooperation between its own institutional structures to be able to carry out the entire 
GSP Plus programme. Third, the respective authorities were able to convince the 
originally ‗indifferent attitude‘ of the private sector towards GSP Plus conditions. 
Fourth, it seems that the Pakistani government was also able to give an impression that 
the human rights situation in the country is improving. But as already indicated above, 
this does not reflect the realities on the ground. Religious and ethnic minority rights are 
often bluntly violated and the rights and interests of certain regions like Balochistan 
andGilgit-Baltistan are treated with contempt. In brief, the human rights situation in 
Pakistan remains murky (Wolf, 2013d). 
Having this in mind, it is important to be aware of the fact that there was also a 
significant degree of resistance against the granting of GSP Plus to Pakistan within the 
members of the EU. For example, the criticism found its expression on 5 November 
2013 as the International Trade Committee of the European Parliament (INTA) had to 
made a decision regarding the granting the GSP Plus Status to Pakistan (and 9 other 
selected countries). Besides the fact that INTA voted against a resolution opposing the 
grant of the GSP Plus Status (cf. Khan, 2013), 12 (out of 30 votes) were not in favour. 
This marks an interesting aspect of the whole GSP Plus process,which are worth 
looking at in detail. Here, one has to recognize that the result of this vote mainly comes 
from an intrinsic divide within the EU between the ‗Northern States‘ and the ‗Southern 
States‘. The ‗Northern bloc‘, mainly comprising the Scandinavian states (also known as 
the ‗free traders‘), Germany, and UK.Foremost, Berlin and London were already keen to 
grand Pakistan GSP Plus Status a couple of years before, especially after the traumatic 
experience of the 2010 flooding.  
 
 
The ‗Southern alliance‘, on the other hand,shares a common interest in protectionism. 
These memberstatesare concerned that Pakistan‘s GSP Plus status would negatively 
impact their own economies by taking away jobs in their own clothing industries (cf. 
Sultana, 2013, 40). It is because of that that the EU for long preferred to provide 
humanitarian aid, as opposed to trade benefits. However, some Pakistan products 
received in the past duty free access but items perceived as a challenge for European 
products2 were excluded from the list of favoured import items (cf. Siegmann, 2013). 
Therefore, it is unfortunate but obvious that the decision pro- or against the GSP Status 
for Pakistan was rather made on the basis of economic interests of the individual 
member states, less on the evaluation of the human rights situation and the matching 
of the necessary requirements. Leaving asidethe fact that several human and labour 
rights organizations have raised their concerns about Pakistan‘s commitment to these 
requirements, it seems that the economic paradigm continues to dominate the EU-
Pakistan relations.  
Also on the level on the individual member states and their bilateral relations with 
Pakistan, it does not seem that there is any significant impetus to put pressure on the 
EU institutions to make Islamabad stick to its commitments. Instead,a ‗strategic 
silence‘ can be observed in European foreign policy circles when it comes to getting 
strict in insisting on international standards and conventions, especially in the context 
of human rights, political and religious freedom. European ambivalence in vocally 
claiming and practically enforcing democratic values in the South Asian context is not 
only obvious when its own economic interests areat stake, but even more when it 
intersects the transatlantic relationship. In other words, Europe‘s approach towards 
Pakistan is still far from independent from US interests and interference. For example, 
there are no doubts that Germany will do anything which will turn out to be perceived 
as an unnecessary burden for its relations with Washington. Berlin‘s maneuver of 
sitting out the issue of granting Edward Snowden potential asylum, or the National 
Security Agency (NSA) affair of tapping Germans communication systems can be seen 
 
 
as clear indications thereof. The ‗official indignation‘ of the German government in this 
context has to be seen rather as a distraction of Europe‘s public attention from certain 
political developments in Brussels (initiated by Germany) than a severe ‗huff‘ about the 
US ignorance of the private sphere of German citizens.  
In consequence, many of the European evaluations, which are announcing processes of 
democratic consolidation look rather as attempts of politically motivated ‗whitewashing‘ 
then credible assessments of the real status quo in Pakistan.3 Therefore, Pakistan‘s 
establishment is enjoying a situation in which one can ignore the implementation of 
commitments without fearing significant consequences. In consequence, the 
enthusiastic reform measures regarding the improvement of the conditions of 
disadvantaged communities and regions, and especially their implementation, remains 
rather the exception than the norm.  
To conclude, the EU has to make sure that Pakistan‘s political establishment and law 
enforcement agencies do more than merely paying lip service to democratic values and 
human rights. Furthermore, Europe needs to monitor the implementation of 
international commitments. It is important for the decision-makers in the EU to 
demonstrate the political will to implement the opportunities given by GSP Plus to 
them, and to show that withdrawal of the benefits in case of non compliance with the 
prerequisites remains a able option. The case of Sri Lanka,4 which temporarily lost its 
GSP status after a series of violations of the conventions, should serve as a reminder for 
Pakistan‘s elite that the EU is willing and able to react according the recommendations 
of the strict monitoring mechanism of the implementation of GSP Plus requirements.5 
Here, the EU must also take into account the likelihood that the ‗non-economic 
motivation‘ of the new civilian government in intensifying cooperation is also to a 
certain extent an outcome of the growing anti-American sentiments in Pakistan and 
less in the convictions of European values (Wolf, 2013d). In addition, Islamabad has to 
realize that the granting of concessions and aid come hand in hand with 
responsibilities. The arguments that have persistently been made over the last decades 
 
 
– that changes need time, and the security of the state must deserve the primary 
attention (which absorbs of coursethe bulk of the national resources) – cannot be used 
anymore as an excuse to not deliver the implementation of international commitments 
and domestic political-decision making. Therefore, the reiterated demands for more 
(unconditional) funds successfully addressed towards the international community by 
concurrent negligence of its own homework or performing basic duties (like paying taxes 
or energy bills), must come to an end. Otherwise, the establishment in Pakistan will 
interpret GSP Plus as just another ‗carte blanche‘ for financial and economic benefits. 
However, in order to do so, Europe has to recall its democratic norms and values in its 
foreign policy decisions. In sum, whitewashing can‘t be an alternative for a sustainable, 
constructive and relationship with Pakistan. 
Notes :  
1. See for more details: European Commission, Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/generalised-
scheme-of-preferences/index_en.htm. 
2. For example knit wear, bed linen, apparel, and home textile(cf. Siegmann, 2013; cf. 
Sultana, 2013). 
3. For a critical assessment of Pakistan‘s latest political development, see Wolf (2013a, 
2013b, 2013c). 
4. The EU suspended Sri Lanka‘s GSP status after violations of the human rights 
conventions in the context of the armed confrontation with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) leading to their military defeat. 
5. See European Commission, 15.2.2010, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=515. 
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